W e exploit the information in the options market to study the variations of return risk and market prices of different sources of risk during the rise and fall of the Nasdaq market. We specify a model that accommodates fluctuations in both risk levels and market prices of different sources of risk, and we estimate the model using the time-series returns and option prices on the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock. Our analysis reveals three key variations during the period from March 1999 to March 2001. First, return volatility increased together with the rising Nasdaq index level, even though the two tend to move in opposite directions. Second, although the market price of diffusion return risk averages around 1.82 over the whole sample, the estimates reached negative territory at the end of 1999. The estimates reverted back to highly positive values after the collapse of the Nasdaq market. Third, the market price of jump risk increased with the rising Nasdaq valuation, and this increase in market price coincided with an increased imbalance in open interest between put and call options.
Introduction
The Nasdaq market endured an unusual transformation at the turn of the 21st century. During the one-year period from March 1999 to March 2000, the Nasdaq 100 index, which constitutes the vast majority of the Nasdaq market capitalization, rose by 128%. Stock prices started to decline after that, and by March 2001 the level of the Nasdaq 100 index was about 30% of its peak value in 2000, a phenomenon labeled by many as the "Nasdaq bubble."
This paper provides a framework for analyzing the behavior of return risk and market prices of different sources of risk as revealed by option prices on the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock over the rise and fall of the Nasdaq.
In contrast to earlier bubbles, e.g., Dutch tulip mania and the South Sea bubble, the Nasdaq bubble segment incorporates a unique additional information source in the form of option quotes on the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock. Each day, option prices of different strikes and maturities provide us with a picture of the market's perception of the risk level and the conditional return distribution over different forwardlooking horizons (Aït-Sahalia and Lo 1998 , Birru and Figlewski 2009 , Figlewski 2009 ). Thus, by analyzing the variations of the option prices and the underlying index, one can infer how the return risk and market prices of risk have varied during the bubble period.
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For this purpose, we specify a model that accommodates several distinct risk sources: (i) diffusion return risk, (ii) return volatility risk, (iii) upside jump risk, and (iv) downside jump risk. We assign a separate market price for each risk source, and we decompose the variations in the return risk premium into variations in the return risk level and in the market prices of different sources of risk. We also present an estimation procedure to extract the variations of return risk and market prices of risk from the option prices and the daily stock returns, while accounting for the correlation between option errors across option strikes and maturities.
Our model construction and estimation shows that return risk started to climb in late 1999 and spiked after the collapse of the Nasdaq. Return volatility calmed down during a short period in the middle of 1 Ever since the classic works by Garber (1989) and Kindleberger (2000) , bubbles and bursts have been a recurring theme of the financial market research. See, for instance, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) , Battalio and Schultz (2006) , Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) , Dhar and Goetzmann (2005) , Griffin et al. (2004) , Hong et al. (2006) , Lakonishok et al. (2007) , LeRoy (2004) , Richardson (2002, 2003) , Pástor and Veronesi (2006) , Schwert (2002) , and Temin and Voth (2004) .
2000 as the Nasdaq market experienced a short-lived recovery, but volatility rose again together with further deterioration in market capitalization.
Our estimation also identifies significant variations in the market prices of different sources of risk around the bubble period. The estimates for the market price for diffusion risk average around 1.82, close to common findings in the literature, but the estimates turned negative from September 21, 1999, to January 5, 2000, as the Nasdaq kept increasing. These negative estimates reflect a possible increase in the market's appetite for risk, and/or investors' subjective beliefs about future cash flows became much rosier than reality during this period.
We find that the market price of jump risk rose with the Nasdaq. The elevated market price of jump risk reflects put options becoming more expensive than call options during this period. This put-call price asymmetry is supported by a corresponding imbalance in the put-call open interest. On average, the open interest and trading volume are both higher for call options than for put options on the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock. However, the put open interest became much higher than the call open interest heading into the collapse of the Nasdaq.
Overall, our results show that the options market can provide an informative perspective about the development and analysis of financial bubbles and crises, and about how investors react to various sources of risk. Along the same lines, Birru and Figlewski (2009) provide insights on the most recent financial crisis of 2008 by analyzing the riskneutral return densities implied by the S&P 500 index options.
The next section formalizes the model structure that decomposes the sources of return risk premium and characterizes the market prices of risk. Section 3 discusses the data, and §4 outlines the estimation procedure. Section 5 presents our estimation results on the behavior of the return risk and the market prices of risk, specific to the rise and the fall of the Nasdaq. Conclusions are offered in §6.
Risk Sources and Market Prices
We first decompose the index return into several risk sources and then assign a separate market price to each risk source. The decomposition of risk and market prices of risk, via a model, allows us to investigate whether risk levels and/or market prices of various sources of risk experienced systematic variations during the bubble period.
The Model Specification
Fix a filtered probability space t t≥0
, and let S t be the level of the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock at time t. Assume that S t is governed by the following stochastic differential equation:
where S t− denotes the time-t prejump level of the stock price. The instantaneous return dS t /S t− is decomposed into four components. The first component includes the ex-dividend riskfree return (r t − q t ) and an instantaneous return risk premium rp t . We allow the instantaneous interest rate r t and the dividend yield q t to evolve deterministically over time, and we derive the return risk premium based on our risk and market price specifications.
The second component captures the innovation of a continuous component, with dW t denoting the change of a standard Brownian motion and V t denoting its instantaneous variance rate, which varies stochastically according to the following stochastic differential equation:
where dZ t denotes the change of another standard Brownian motion, correlated with the Brownian movement in the return by dt = Ɛ dW t dZ t . Given this correlation, we can decompose the Brownian motion in the stock return into two components:
where dB t denotes the Brownian component in the stock return that is independent of the variance rate movement. The third and fourth components in Equation (1) capture the contributions of upside and downside jumps, with 0+ and 0− denoting the positive and negative halfs of the real line excluding zero, respectively. In particular, + dx dt and − dx dt count the number of upside and downside jumps of size x at time t, with V t + x dx dt and V t − x dx dt being the corresponding compensators for two types of jumps, respectively.
In the model, V t governs not only the instantaneous variance rate of the Brownian movement, but also the arrival rate of upside and downside jumps. Furthermore, departing from Merton (1976) , the model treats upside jumps and downside jumps separately, with + x and − x controlling the distribution of the upside and downside jumps, respectively.
We assume an exponential distribution for both types of jumps:
where controls the mean arrival intensity, and + and − control how fast the number of upside and downside jumps decrease with increasing jump sizes.
The jump process has a stochastic arrival rate of
− . Conditional on a jump occurring, the jump size x in log return has a double-exponential distribution as in Kou (2002) .
Under our specification, the instantaneous stock return variance rate is V t 1 + 2
, with the variance contribution from the diffusion component being V t and the variance contribution from the jump component being 2V t
To link the statistical dynamics to market prices of various sources of risk, we specify the dynamics of the state-price deflator t as
The specification assigns a separate market price for each of the four sources of risk: the independent diffusive return risk B , the diffusion variance risk Z , the upside jump risk J + , and the downside jump risk J − . The market prices of different sources of risk capture the differences between the risk-neutral dynamics and the statistical dynamics as a result of (i) investors' risk aversions to different sources of risk and/or (ii) deviations of investors' subjective beliefs from statistical realities. We identify these market prices without making a distinction between the two explanations.
Our model is in line with extant literature and is designed to address the question of how the market prices of different risk sources changed during the Nasdaq bubble period. Earlier works, e.g., Bakshi et al. (1997) and Huang and Wu (2004) , often combine Heston's (1993) stochastic volatility specification with Merton's (1976) jump diffusion. The doubleexponential specification of Kou (2002) in Equation (4) provides an attractive alternative to the Merton (1976) model, while allowing us to consider the distinct pricing of downside and upside jumps.
The Return Risk Premium Decomposition
Under our specification of risk dynamics and market prices of different sources of risk, we can decompose the return risk premium into two components: the return risk level as captured by the variance rate V t and the risk premium per unit risk. We can further attribute the risk premium per unit risk to contributions from diffusion risks and contributions from jump risks. 
Conditional on a fixed return risk level, the diffusion risk premium is given by the negative of the covariance between the diffusion innovations in the return and the state-price deflator,
which captures the contribution from both the return risk B t and the variance risk Z t . The jump risk premium is obtained by performing the integration (e.g., Küchler and Sørensen 1997)
the magnitude of which is determined by the market prices of upside and downside jumps J + and J − , respectively. The market price of the diffusion return risk, B , generates a return risk premium as in Merton (1976) . In addition, the market price of diffusion variance risk Z also contributes to the diffusion return risk premium d through its correlation with the return innovation. Furthermore, the market prices of upside and downside jump risks ( J + and J − ) induce additional risk premiums in the form of J in (8). Finally, stochastic volatility renders the risk premium stochastic as the risk premium is proportional to the variance rate V t . Equation (7) suggests that a positive market price of return risk ( B ) generates a positive return risk premium. Furthermore, when the return and the variance rate has a negative correlation ( < 0), a positive return risk premium can also result from a negative market price of variance risk ( Z < 0). Positive market prices for jump risks generate a positive return risk premium, as reflected in Equation (8).
Unlike the traditional focus on the behavior of total return risk premium in some early studies of bubbles and bursts, the risk premium decomposition in Theorem 1 is imperative to our analysis. The first question to ask is whether a risk premium change is due to a change in return risk level (V t ) or a change in its market price (the risk premium per unit return risk, ). Our explicit distinction and separate estimation of the two components are important for understanding how the return risk level and the market price per unit risk had varied separately during the bubble period.
Second, by classifying the different risk sources and assigning a different market price to each risk source, we can go one step further in documenting the different variations of the market prices on different risk sources over the Nasdaq bubble period. In this sense, our goals are aligned with those of Bollerslev and Todorov (2009) and Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) , who study the time variation in risk premiums, and with those of Figlewski (2009) , who analyzes the variation of the risk-neutral density of the S&P 500 index return over the 2008 crisis period. 
The Information Content in Option Prices
Given the state-price deflator specification in (5), the price dynamics under the risk-neutral measure can be written as (Küchler and Sørensen 1997) 
where + x and − x are exponential tilted versions of their statistical counterparts,
2 See also, among others, Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) , Bollen and Whaley (2004) , Huang and Wu (2004) from which we can define the risk-neutral dampening coefficients as
Positive market prices on the two jump risks increase the dampening on upside jumps but reduce the dampening on downside jumps. As a result, the return innovation distribution becomes more negatively skewed under the risk-neutral measure .
The risk-neutral dynamics of the instantaneous variance rate in our setting become
with ≡ + Z and ≡ / . A negative market price of variance risk reduces the risk-neutral meanreversion speed and increases the risk-neutral mean of the variance rate.
The Fourier transform of the log return under the risk-neutral measure is exponential affine in the variance rate V t ,
where denotes the parameter set, and the coefficients a and b are functions of the parameters that govern the return risk dynamics and market prices of risk,
with
, and the risk-neutral characteristic exponent of the standardized log return innovation with V t fixed at unity:
Given the Fourier transform in (15), we can numerically compute the time-t values of options with time to maturity via fast Fourier inversion, as proposed in Carr and Madan (1999) and Carr and Wu (2004) .
Equations (15)- (17) show that the option value depends on the return risk level V t as well as the parameters that govern the price and variance rate dynamics and the market prices of risk. We can use the observed option prices across different strikes and maturities each day to infer the return risk level and the market prices on that date.
The Information Content in Stock Returns
Time-series observations of returns provide additional information on the price dynamics, as revealed through the likelihood or, equivalently, the conditional probability density of the returns.
To incorporate this information in our estimation, let ln S t+h /S t denote the time-t log return over a sampling frequency of h. Analogous to (15), the return characteristic function under measure is
where
with ≡ − iu , ≡ 2 + 2 2 , and
Conditional on the variance rate level V t , we can apply fast Fourier transform to the return characteristic function in Equation (18) to obtain the corresponding conditional probability density.
Data on the Nasdaq Tracking Stock and Options
We estimate the risk dynamics and market prices of risk using both the time-series returns and option prices on the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock. The Nasdaq 100 index captures the vast majority of the Nasdaq market capitalization and strongly comoves with the Nasdaq composite index. For estimation, we sample the data daily from March 17, 1999 , to February 19, 2003 . Daily log returns on the index tracking stock are computed based on daily closing dividend-adjusted prices. The time series of excess log returns is obtained by subtracting the overnight London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) from the daily returns.
Options on the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock are actively traded. We obtain the options data from the "Ivy DB" data set sold by OptionMetrics. Because these options are American style, OptionMetrics employs a binomial tree approach to adjust for the early exercise feature in calculating the implied volatility from the daily closing midquote of the option.
Put-call parity dictates that the put and the call options at the same strike and maturity should generate the same implied volatility. At times, OptionMetrics generates two different implied volatilities when its assumptions on the interest rate curve, the dividend schedule, and the borrow cost differ from the market (see also Lamont and Thaler 2003) . To rectify this aberration, we choose, at each maturity, the strike closest to the spot price and measure the difference between the OptionMetrics implied volatility estimates for the call and the put options. Then, we add half of the difference to call implied volatility estimates and deduct half of the difference to put implied volatility estimates. Through this adjustment, the implied volatilities corresponding to the put and the call at the strike closest to the spot price become identical to each other. At other strikes, we take the adjusted implied volatility of the out-of-the-money (OTM) options, i.e., the call option when the strike is above the spot, and the put option when the strike is below the strike.
We convert the implied volatility at each strike and maturity into the corresponding OTM European option value according to the Black and Scholes (1973) pricing formula. The forward price is computed based on the interest rate curve and the dividend projection provided by OptionMetrics.
Similar to extant practices (e.g., see the details in Figlewski 2009), we apply three additional filters to the data in constructing the daily options sample. First, the bid price is greater than zero. Second, the option maturity is no less than ten days and no more than one year. Third, the strikes of the options are confined to two standard deviations of the forward. The procedure generates 159,218 option prices over 987 business days. Table 1 displays summary information on the time series of the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock and its daily returns in panel A, and on the options sample in panel B. Panel A shows that the average price of the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock is $53.32 over our sample period from March 17, 1999 , to February 19, 2003 . The lowest level is $19.55, and the highest level is $114.74. The daily return has a standard deviation of 3.01% per day, with the largest single day percentage Daily log stock returns on the Nasdaq 100 index are computed based on daily closing dividend-adjusted prices. Options data are from OptionMetrics, which computes the options implied volatilities based on a binomial tree. The options sample is selected according to the following criteria: (i) the bid price is greater than zero, (ii) the option maturity is between 10 days and one year, (iii) the strikes of the options are confined to two standard deviations of the forward, and (iv) the out-of-the-money option is chosen at each strike and maturity. The selection criteria yield a total of 159,218 observations, among which 70,185 are calls and 89,033 are puts.
return drop at −9 06% and the largest single day spike at 15.57%. Panel B shows that, on average, 71 call options and 90 put options are used per day for the estimation. Over time, the number of calls per day varies from zero to 176, and the number of puts per day varies from 20 to 235. We filter the options to have maturities of no less than 10 days and no more than 365 days, with an average maturity of 129 days. The Black and Scholes (1973) implied volatilities for calls Table 2 Options Open Interest, Volume, and Implied Volatility by Maturity and Moneyness Nasdaq 100 puts (%) Nasdaq 100 calls (%) Notes. Entries report summary statistics on the Nasdaq 100 options by maturity and moneyness over the daily sample period from March 17, 1999 , to February 19, 2003 . The data are from OptionMetrics. Maturity is in number of actual days, and moneyness is defined as ln K /F t T , where F t T is the forward price and K is the strike.
average at 43.43% and vary from 24.82% to 95.52%. The put implied volatilities are higher, with an average of 50.56%, a minimum of 27.67%, and a maximum of 108.36%. In Table 2 we divide the options sample into six moneyness and four maturity regions, and report the average statistics in each of the 24 moneyness/ maturity regions. Maturity is measured in number of actual days, and moneyness is in absolute percentage log strike deviation from forward, ln K/F , where K is the strike price, and F is the forward. Panel A reports the average daily open interest in each region, and panel B reports the average daily trading volume. Over our sample period, the average open interest and trading volume on OTM calls are higher than their put counterparts. Furthermore, trading volume and open interest are concentrated in options with maturities within six months, with trading activities waning thereafter.
Panel C of Table 2 reports the average implied volatility across different moneyness and maturity regions. At short maturities (10-90 days), the average implied volatility is U-shaped in moneyness. At longer maturities, the moneyness relation becomes downward sloping, with the average implied volatilities at low strikes higher than the average implied volatilities at high strikes.
The Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Our model features stochastic volatility, a separation of up and down jumps, and stochastically varying risk premia on each type of risk. The aim of this section is to present a procedure to estimate the risk dynamics V t jointly with the market prices of risk, based on the daily time series of returns and option prices on the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock. We estimate the model parameters by maximizing the joint likelihood of the option prices and daily returns. To construct the likelihood function, we cast the model into a state-space form and extract the distributions of the states at each date using a filtering technique.
The Propagation Equations
Our base model assumes that all the market prices of risk coefficients Z B J + J − are constant. In this case, we regard the instantaneous variance rate as the state X t = V t . The state propagation equation is determined by the statistical dynamics of the variance rate in Equation (2).
To analyze the return risk and risk premium variation around the rise and fall of the Nasdaq, we extend the base model to accommodate time-varying market prices for different sources of risk. In this extension, we use z t ≡ Z ln + ln − to denote the additional state variables that we allow to vary over time, and we use X t = V t z t as the expanded state vector. We retain the assumption of a constant market price of return risk B , because its identification comes mainly from the daily returns, and options provide little information on inferring this coefficient. Furthermore, with ( + − ) fixed, we use the variation of + − to reflect the variation in the market prices of upside and downside jumps ( J + J − , with J + = + − + and J − = − − − . The log transformation of + and − expands the domain of the two coefficients to the whole real line.
We specify the following auxiliary dynamics for z t = Z ln + ln − :
where z = Z ln + ln − denotes the long-run mean vector. We also use two auxiliary coefficients, z and z , to capture the mean reversion speed and variance of z t , respectively, with t denoting a standardized normal vector.
To avoid the complication of convexity terms for option pricing, we take the market prices as deterministically time varying and treat Equation (21) as a conditional forecasting equation analogous to the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) specification for volatilities (Engle 1982 , Bollerslev 1986 ). Hence, the filtered updates on z t can be regarded as time-t forecasts of future market prices of risk.
For both constant and time-varying market prices of risk specifications, we can write the state propagation equation generically as
where t is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard normal innovation vector, and t−1 denotes the conditional covariance matrix of the innovation.
When X t = V t , Equation (22) represents a discretized version of the continuous-time dynamics of V t in (2), with A = 1 − e − h , = e − h , t−1 = 2 V t−1 h, and h = 1/252 denoting the daily time interval used in our estimation. When X t = V t z t , the state propagation equation is expanded accordingly, with A = 1 − e − h 1 − z z , indicating a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements given by e − h z e 3 , e 3 denoting a three-dimensional vector of ones, and t−1 also indicating a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements given by 2 V t−1 h 2 z e 3 .
The Measurement Equations
The measurement equations are constructed based on the observed OTM option prices, assuming additive, normally distributed measurement errors. Let y t denote these observed option prices at time t, and let X t denote their corresponding model values as a function of the state level X t and the model parameters . We can write the measurement equation as
with e t denoting the measurement error. Because the exchange-listed option contracts have fixed strikes and fixed expirations, the moneyness and time to maturity of each contract varies daily as time passes by and as the spot level changes. Furthermore, with old contracts expiring and new contracts being issued, the number of option contracts, and hence the dimension of the measurement equation, varies over time. These variations make it difficult to estimate a generic covariance matrix for the measurement errors e t in Equation (23).
To make the estimation steps tractable in our context, we first represent each OTM option price as a percentage of the underlying spot level, and then scale this value by the vega of the option as in Bakshi et al. (2008) . With this scaling, we assume that the scaled measurement errors on all option contracts have the same error variance. As option values vary with moneyness and maturity, so do the measurement errors. The rationale for vega scaling is to make option values more comparable across moneyness and maturity, thereby facilitating the simplifying assumption of identical error variance.
Adjusting for Cross-Dependence and Serial
Dependence in Measurement Errors Measurement errors on different option contracts are likely to be correlated. We capture this correlation of the measurement errors between contracts i and j through the following functional form:
where D denotes the Black and Scholes (1973) delta of the option, and denotes the option maturity in years. Intuitively, as the distance between the two contracts in terms of moneyness and maturity increases, the correlation declines. The two positive scaling parameters g d and g m control the speed of decline along the two dimensions, respectively. We treat the two scaling coefficients as free parameters and determine their value through the maximum likelihood estimation. Furthermore, a positive measurement error today is likely to be followed by a positive measurement error tomorrow on the same contract. To rectify the impact of serial dependence on our estimation, we assume the following error structure for each contract i: With these assumptions, we can build the covariance matrix of the measurement errors t−1 at each date t.
The Filtering Procedure
Let X t , X t ,ȳ t , y t denote the time-t − 1 forecasts of time-t values of the state, the covariance matrix of the state, the measurement series, and the covariance matrix of the measurement series, respectively, and let X t and X t denote the ex post updates on the state vector and the state covariance based on observations y t at time t.
Given the Gaussian linear structure of the statepropagation equation in (22), we generate the state predictions analytically as
In the case of linear measurement equations of the form y t = HX t + e t , the predicted values of the measurements and their covariances can also be computed analytically:
The filtering of the states can be performed according to the classic Kalman (1960) filter,
where K t is the Kalman gain, given by K t = Xy t y t −1 . In our application, the measurement equation in (23) is nonlinear. We use the unscented Kalman filter (Wan and van der Merwe 2001) to handle this nonlinearity. Under this approach, we first approximate the distribution of the state vector using a set of deterministically chosen sigma points and then propagate these sigma points through the nonlinear measurement equation.
Specifically, let p be the number of states, > 0 be a control parameter, and i be the ith column of a matrix . A set of 2p + 1 sigma vectors i are generated based on the conditional mean and covariance forecasts on the state vector according to the equations (29) with corresponding weights w i given by
We can regard these sigma vectors as forming a discrete distribution, taking w i the corresponding probabilities. Given the sigma points, we can compute the predicted values of the measurements and their covariances asȳ
With the conditional mean and covariance computed from the sigma points, we can apply the Kalman (1960) filter in Equation (28) to update the states and their covariances.
The Joint Log-Likelihood from Options and Index Returns
The unscented Kalman filter is applied to the options data sequentially from the first day to the last day of the observation. With the filtering results, we construct the log-likelihood for each day's option observations by assuming that the forecasting errors are normally distributed:
Furthermore, conditional on the state vector filtered from the options, we compute the conditional probability density of the log return, f x V t = 1 0 e −iux t u V t du, through the fast Fourier inversion of the characteristic function ( t u V t ) in Equation (18). We first compute the probability density numerically on a fine grid of return values x, and then map the grid to the realized return on that day, ln S t+1 /S t , to obtain the conditional probability density of the realized return, f ln S t+1 /S t V t . Then, we compute the conditional log-likelihood of the daily return as
Finally, assuming conditional independence between the options forecasting errors and the daily returns, we construct the joint daily log-likelihood as the sum of the log-likelihoods from the two data sources in (32) and (33), respectively. We choose model parameters to maximize the joint log-likelihoods from both options and daily returns,
where T = 987 denotes the number of days in our sample. Notes. Entries report the maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters with time-varying market prices of risk. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The estimation is based on daily time-series returns and option prices on Nasdaq 100 tracking stock over the sample period from March 17, 1999 , to February 19, 2003 . Likelihoods on options are constructed by assuming normally distributed options forecasting errors, with the mean and covariance of the forecasts obtained from the unscented Kalman filter. Likelihoods on daily returns are computed by inverting the characteristic function of the daily return, conditional on the variance rate extracted from the options. The joint likelihood is obtained by assuming independence between options forecasting errors and daily stock returns.
Risk and Market Price Variations During the Bubble Period
Through model estimation, we extract the variation of the return variance rate (V t ), as a measure of the return risk level, and the market prices of different sources of risk on the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock. We document how they vary during the rise and fall of the Nasdaq market.
We have estimated models with both constant and time-varying market prices of risk. The two models generate similar parameter estimates and return variances, confirming the robustness of our specifications and estimation methodology. For ease of exposition, we focus on the model with time-varying market prices of risk, with parameter estimates reported in Table 3 . We also provide the parameter estimates under constant market prices in the appendix. The parameter estimates in panel D in both tables show the relevance of accounting for cross-correlations and serial correlations among the measurement errors on the options.
Return Volatility Increased with Nasdaq 100
Valuation Panel A of Table 3 presents the estimates of parameters governing the variance rate dynamics in (2), with the corresponding t-statistics in parenthesis. The parameters of the variance dynamics are estimated with a high degree of statistical significance, suggesting that the estimation procedure is successful in identifying the evolution of return volatility.
The estimate for the variance of variance coefficient is large at 0 7927, suggesting that the return variance itself is highly volatile. The estimate for the speed of mean-reversion coefficient is also large at 9 2169, implying quick mean reversion in the Nasdaq volatility variation. The long-run mean ( ) estimate of 0.1179 represents an average volatility level of 34.68%, computed as 1 + 2 −3 + + −3 − . Last, the diffusion component of the return innovation and the variance innovation have a strongly negative correlation at = −0 8389, which contributes to the implied volatility skew observed at moderate to long maturities (Table 2) .
To assess how return volatility varied around the rise and fall of the Nasdaq, Figure 1 During the two-year period, the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock rose from $50 in March 1999 to $115 in March 2000 and then fell to $33 in April 2001. During this process, the volatility started at a relatively low level in March 1999, at about 33%, but steadily increased as the Nasdaq 100 index climbed, and reached 49% at the peak of the Nasdaq 100 valuation in March 2000. Figure 1 reveals a positive comovement between the level of the Nasdaq 100 and its return volatility prior to the collapse of the Nasdaq market. Under normal market conditions, equity volatility tends to decline with rising equity values. The volatility continued rising as the Nasdaq 100 started to fall, and peaked at 78% on April 14, 2000. The volatility remained high after the collapse of the Nasdaq in March 2000. Return volatility subsided for a few months when the Nasdaq market stabilized, but trended upward thereafter as the Nasdaq index continued its downfall. The rising Nasdaq volatility during the bubble period has also been observed by Schwert (2002) in a different context.
Several theoretical models explain how volatility can increase as a bubble builds. For example, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) propose an equilibrium model where overconfidence generates disagreements among agents regarding asset fundamentals. These disagreements, combined with short-sale constraints, can push up both the asset price and its volatility.
Market Price of Diffusion Risk Declined with
Rising Nasdaq Valuation Panel C of Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates related to the market prices and their variations. In accordance with Equation (7) of Theorem 1, the market price of diffusion risk can be computed as d = B 1 − 2 + Z . The estimate for the market price of diffusion return risk B is positive at 1 1209, and the estimate for the long-run mean of the diffusion variance risk Z is −1 4325.
Given the negative correlation between return and variance, both estimates contribute to an average positive diffusion return risk premium d of 1.82 per unit risk. This average estimate is in line with the common findings of the literature (e.g., Bliss and Panigirtzoglou 2004, Bakshi et al. 2008) .
By allowing Z to vary over time, the market price of diffusion return risk d varies accordingly. Figure 2 contrasts the variation of d with the Nasdaq 100 valuation during the two-year period from March 1999 to April 2001. The market price of diffusion risk started close to its average value at 1.88, and began to decline as the Nasdaq 100 price went up. From September 21, 1999, to January 5, 2000, the market price of diffusion risk reached negative territory. This period of negative market price coincided with the rising Nasdaq 100 valuation.
The market price of diffusion risk started to increase thereafter. Following the collapse of the Nasdaq market, the market price reached historically high values in May 2000, which were about twice as high as the sample average, and stayed high for a period of four months.
The market price of diffusion risk reflects either or both of (i) investors' aversion to diffusion risk and (ii) deviations of investors' subjective beliefs from statistical realities about future cash flows. The negative market price estimates before 2000 highlight a combination of the market's appetite for risk and an exaggerated view of future cash flows that coincided with the trending Nasdaq valuation. On the other hand, the highly positive market price estimates after the Nasdaq collapse reflect investors' renewed aversion to diffusive risk and a realigned projection about future cash flow. (8) and (13), we can express the market price of jump risk as Based on the extracted time series on (ln + ln − ), we compute the time series on the market price of jump risk J via (35). Figure 3 contrasts its variation with the rise and fall of the Nasdaq 100 valuation from March 1999 to April 2001. Given the data noise on deep OTM options, the daily estimates for the market price of jump risk appear to be noisy. To obtain a clearer 
Market Price of Jump Risk Rose with Nasdaq 100 Valuation Combining Equations
J = + − 1 −1 − −1 + + − + 1 −1 − −1 − − + − 1 −1 − + −1 + − + 1 −1 − − −1(35)
Risk-Neutral Tail Asymmetry and
Nasdaq Valuations With the jump structure under the statistical measure ( + − ) held invariant, the variations of the market price of jump risk J are driven by the relative variations of the risk-neutral jump dampening coefficients + − . A higher estimate for + than for − implies that the left tail of the risk-neutral return innovation distribution is heavier than the right tail. Therefore, we can measure the risk-neutral tail asymmetry by the difference in the dampening coefficients, NSKEW ≡ + − − , which is another way to assess how expensive OTM put options are relative to OTM call options of comparable moneyness. A higher difference translates into a more negatively skewed risk-neutral return innovation distribution. Figure 4 plots the time series of NSKEW estimates and contrasts its variation with that of the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock. As with the market price of jump risk, we smooth the daily NSKEW estimates to remove the temporal noise.
The difference NSKEW has stayed positive during the whole sample period, indicating that OTM puts have been more expensive than the corresponding OTM calls, and that the left tail of the return innovation has been heavier than the right tail. What may be more informative, however, is the observation that this price asymmetry increased as rapidly as the price rise of the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock. OTM put options became increasingly expensive as the underlying stock price increased.
Because OTM put options are natural instruments for hedging against market crashes, it is possible that as the Nasdaq 100 rose, investors became increasingly worried about its sustainability and started to buy OTM put options to hedge against a potential collapse. The buying pressure raised the OTM put prices more than it did the OTM call prices, thus generating a more negatively skewed risk-neutral return distribution.
Supporting Evidence from Open Interest on
Puts and Calls To gauge whether the observed risk-neutral tail asymmetry is supported by the demand imbalance for different types of options contracts, we retrieve the daily aggregate open interest data from OptionMetrics for calls and puts on the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock. are expressed in natural logs of the aggregate number of contracts.
The plot shows a steady increase of daily open interest for both calls and puts. From the start of the sample in March 1999 to mid 2000, the open interest for puts are higher than that for calls. After that, we observe a reversal in the demand, with more open interest for calls than for puts. Over the whole sample period, the average open interest for calls are higher than for puts. The same average imbalance pattern holds for the selected options sample used for model estimation (Table 2) .
To highlight the time variation of the imbalance between the call and put open interests, we define a put-call open interest imbalance measure as higher demand for call options than for put options on average, the demand for put options outweighed the demand for call options as the Nasdaq 100 trended upward in late 1999 and early 2000. The asymmetries in both option prices and open interests were released only after the collapse of the Nasdaq market.
Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a theoretical and empirical framework to study the variations of risk and market prices of different sources of risk over the Nasdaq bubble period. Our model estimation identifies three major variations in the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock during the bubble period.
First, return volatility as a risk measure increased with the rising valuation of the Nasdaq 100, even though the two tend to move in opposite directions under normal market conditions. Second, the estimates for the market price for diffusion risk average around 1.82, close to common findings in the literature, but the estimates became negative from September 21, 1999, to January 5, 2000, as the Nasdaq index rose.
Third, the market price of jump risk became unusually high as the bubble built up. This elevated market price is a result of Nasdaq 100 puts becoming more expensive than calls during this period, which we trace to the imbalance in their respective open interests. Although call options on average have higher open interest and trading volume than put options for the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock, the open interest for put options, which can be used for hedging market crashes, became much higher than the open interest for calls as the Nasdaq 100 price became increasingly unsustainable.
The presence of options trading on the Nasdaq 100 tracking stock enhances our identification of all three pieces of evidence. By combining the information in option prices across all strikes and maturities with the time-series returns on the index tracking stock, we have achieved a sharper separation of different sources of risk and the market price on each risk source.
Although the focal point of this paper is the Nasdaq bubble, our framework can be adapted to probe the variations in the risk level and market prices of risk during other bubble periods, when options on an underlying index are available. A concrete example is the U.S. national home price index, which rose from 100 to 189 from 2000 to 2006, and then collapsed to 129 in the last quarter of 2008. One can perform an analogous analysis to gain insights about the risk and market price variations from options written on a housing index. 
Appendix. Model Parameter Estimates Under Constant Market Prices of Risk

